Abstract. This paper provides general framework for handling time-varying cost of capital, leverage, tax rates, and capital values in a dynamic free cash flow theory of capital structure. That enables efficient analysis of the recent competing theories of capital structure. After including the costs of financial distress and risk premium of debt in the cash flow model, this paper provides a new look at cost of tax shield from the point of view of risk-return relationship. Cost of tax shield is not constant, but depends on leverage and is mostly between cost of assets and cost of debt. Moreover the simulation of firm value and capital structure in presence of taxes, risk, and growth shows that unique optimal leverages exist for each combination of the above factors. The risk-enhanced cash flow theory can explain both the observations, which support pecking order theory, free cash flow theory and tradeoff theory of capital structure. Moreover it fits some evidence, which resists these theories: highly leveraged low growth companies and moderately leveraged large profitable companies.
Introduction
Free cash flow (FCF) theories of capital structure suffer from circularity, static nature and inability to account properly for growth and risk. Use of dynamic FCF model of capital structure in this paper provides generalized formulas for WACC and cost of equity, and allows us to account for growth while assessing the cost of capital (COC) and to analyze the preceding FCF theories of capital structure. Addition of risk analysis, especially cost of financial distress (CFD), free of disputable assumptions, helps to determine general relationships between COC. Results of this paper provide link between the main groups of capital structure theories: static tradeoff, FCF, and pecking order theories despite some remaining problems, which are inherent to FCF theories of capital structure in general.
Time-varying cost of capital and capital structure
This paper builds on a capital structure CF theory, which enables time-varying COC, CF and leverage. After developing the mathematical apparatus used in this paper I made thorough inspection of English-written literature. Qi (2010: 172) states, "Finally we note that the choice of the discount rate… in determining VTS (value of tax shields, note by author) …. is largely based on arguments for certain special cases, i.e., fixed debt and constant leverage ratio. So far, there has been no rigorous theoretical framework for how to handle VTS, especially for more complicated cases." The same findings can be done by inspection of the theories of tax shield value cited in Fernández (2004) . Some signs of treating time-variant CF start to emerge in English-written capital theory literature recently at Barbi (2012) , but Barbi (2012) keeps still the other variables (esp. COC) constant.
Let X be the value of any of the appropriate types of capital: equity E (leveraged), debt D, assets (total capital at debt-free firm) U, tax shield T or total capital (value of firm) C, and (1) (i.e. X ∈ {E, D, T, U, C}) . At the expense of number of variables I introduce and treat the tax shield and its cost to show 1) that there is interdependence between variables, and 2) how different assumptions (often hidden) have influenced the results of the previous papers.
Let e X be the CF paid to owners of capital X and r X the rate of return required by them, before personal income tax, and after corporate income tax. For any kind of capital the sum of income e X,t in period t ∈ (natural number) and the value of capital at the end of that period X t +1 is equal to the value of capital at the beginning of that period X t plus the required return X t r X ,t :
(2) Based on (2) we can express e X,t :
As equations (2) and (3) are recurrence (or in other words difference) equations, they are valid not only for one period t, but for any row of subsequent periods. We can rearrange (2) for K; K ∈ subsequent periods and X ∈ {E, D, T, U, C}:
(4) COC can vary, i.e.
, as well as for constant CF i.e. , thus also . If e.g. 90% of yearly CF comes in January, it is not the same situation as if company gets those 90% of CF in December. Therefore I do not define the length of period t, which can be short enough to marginalize the problem of changes of CF intensity, capital values, required return rate changes, and tax rate changes during any of the periods 1 … K. Meaning of (3) The sum of values of all types of capital equals the value of firm (⊕ means exclusive or):
The same has to hold in the case of CF:
After substitution of (3) into (6) for X ∈ {E, D ⊕ T, U} we get:
Then let us subtract (5) at time t from (7) and add (5) at time t + 1 to get: 
which can be rewritten with respect to the composition of capital (1):
Equation (10) does not tax the return to debt, compared to the textbook WACC formula.
In fact the taxation of return to debt is artificial -in practice the interest tax shield manifests itself by CF increase, not by COC decrease. Because of X ∈ {E, D ⊕ T, U } and (9), also:
Substituting X ∈ {E, D ⊕ T, U} instead of general X t in (5) and rearranging, we get:
Substituting (12) for U t in (11) and rearranging yields:
The same applies to additive risk premiums in r X,t ; X ∈ {E, D ⊕ T, U }. In the Sharpe (1964) or Ross (1976) mean-variance risk-reward world the equation (13) would result in:
with non-zero b D,t worth mentioning (Davis 2005) .
We can also see in (13), what are the necessary assumptions to reach the "standard" or "textbook" WACC formula, applicable to FCFF. For definition of FCFF see Bucher et al. (2002) . Respecting the definition of FCFF (denoted ), in contrast to capital cash flows (CCF, see Ruback 2002): (15) it is possible to reach the WACC equation:
(16) using the above algorithm if and only if and t t = t t +1 (note that growth rate g is the same for X ∈ {E, D, C }). This is in concert with Massari et al. (2007) , who find the standard WACC formula valid even in steady growth cases (constant capital structure). The use of interest tax shield variables T t and r T,t , enables analysis of assumptions used by different FCF theories of capital structure. T t is the present value of future tax savings realized due to interest accrued to debt (4). Interest payable, not interest paid, reduces the tax base in many jurisdictions (incl. Europe, US). By its nature T t ≥ 0, and e E,t ≥ 0 for every t.
Let us examine the nature of e T,t . Tax shield cannot be pre-paid, drawn or repaid, contrary to other types of capital, as the tax laws in most countries limit the tax-deductibility of the cots to the period, when the costs accrued. At the same time EBIT can be below zero, so that it is not possible to realize any interest tax shield. Moreover the tax deductibility of the past losses is limited in some jurisdictions. To be simple, no carry-forward of tax losses is assumed, thus
Otherwise we would need a separate (probably option-based) model for assessment of the value of the interest-payable-part of losses and its carry-forward capacity. With possibility to carry forward losses, (17) would be more complicated, but there would still be two limiting factors: EBIT and interest accrued.
Financial distress and risk-return framework
The most important limiting factor of up-to-date CF theories of capital structure is fact that the more risky equity (the more levered equity), the higher rate of return, but debt is assumed to be riskless, or at least having leverage-independent rate of return. If the r U,t is higher than the r D,t at low leverages, then the risk of U t and risk of D t at 100% debt financing would have to differ to obey the no-cost-of-bankruptcy assumption (Modigliani, Miller 1958) . Of course r D,t is not constant with respect to leverage (Carlson, Larzak 2011) , i.e. risk of U t would have to depend on financing. Up-to-date CF theories of capital structure do not handle r T,t well. We see mostly leverage-independent r T,t or regime-switching models like Ruback (2002) . We need to introduce cost of financial distress (CFD) in the above mathematical apparatus.
CFD can be related partly to the value of capital alone, and partly to the value of assets (cp. Almeida, Philippon (2007) extensive literature review). But how to distinguish the financial distress cost from the loss of value of assets? When assets start to lose their earnings capacity, CFD is not usually observable in the form of sales decrease yet. But CFD become observable even at low leverages in other forms -credit spreads grow with growing leverage, as Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) show, and also closely correlate with equity premium, cp. (Chen et al. 2009 ). CFD make the r D,t strictly increasing function of leverage, as observed by e.g. Almeida and Philippon (2007) . They report (11), (12), and (14) yield:
(20)
The same applies to additive risk premiums in r X,t ; X ∈ {E, D ⊕ T, U }. Return rate r X,t in (20) can be replaced by b X,t in the Sharpe (1964) or Ross (1976) mean-variance risk-reward world.
In most CF capital structure models r X,t , X t , e X,t ; X ∈ {E, D ⊕ T, U} are expected values, or averages, if it comes to maximum likelihood estimators (MLE). When I further treat r X,t , X t , e X,t ; X ∈ {E, D ⊕ T, U} as stochastic, I denote the MLE I cannot avoid mixing sections of stochastic and deterministic r X,t , X t , e X,t , because I need to introduce risk in the otherwise (usually) deterministic model. Without risk any solution of deterministic FCF capital structure model is possible due to too many unknowns. The subsequent part of this section treats all variables as stochastic.
Staying in Sharpe (1964) or Ross (1976) mean-variance risk-reward world and assuming that there is a common source of risk for any kind of capital in a companyrisk of assets -therefore correlation of market portfolio with returns to E, D, T, U is the same, we get
where r f,t is risk-free rate of return and naturally σ 2 (r f,t ) = 0. What is the source of risk? From the point of view of time t, X t is known. Expressing r X,t from (2), it emerges that
where X t +1 + e X,t -X t is net income in the case X ≡ E, and interest accrued if X ≡ D. Let us assume usual σ 2 (e X,t ) = σ 2 (e X,t +1 ), cov(e X,t , e X,t +n ) = 0. If K = ∞ in (4), then it is also easy to see that cov(e X,t , r X,t ) = 0 . In long term company cannot distribute more profit than is the net income. All together e X,t is the only source of risk in our model. If e X,t is deflated, so that we can denote its generating process as stationary, then (22) yields:
The tax shield is a special case, because it depends on interest accrued(not paid) and its upper bound is tax from EBIT, i.e.
contrary to very commonly stated V (r T,t ) = V (r D,t ), which we would yield if we forgot about the upper limit of the tax shield.
Equation (23) can be used to derive risk of CLT, assets, and tax shield in a FCF capital structure model, because V (r X,t ) is not directly observable at these kinds of capital, as they are not traded publicly. However V (r E,t ) and V (r D,t ) are observable at the capital market.
What is the relation between r D,t , r U,t , and r E,t then? Recall that e E,t is residual item as e E,t = e C,t -e D,t , because payments to creditors have priority. To show the consequences, let us demonstrate two cases of indebted company, i.e. e D,t > 0:
1) company has sufficient earning capacity to satisfy creditors: credit spreads are negligible, V (r D,t ) → 0 + and change of CCF (i.e. e C,t ) shifts almost entirely onto equity:
Then from (22) it emerges that:
2): and company does not have earning capacity to fully satisfy creditors. Then (approximate equalities are used in the case that something is left to share holders):
Note that (shareholders usually do not make capital contributions to financially distressed company) so that e E,t can be described by Pareto distribution. Then V(r E,t ) > 1 due to σ (e E,t ) < , if e E,t follows Pareto distribution type I, III or IV. Then again:
Inequalities (27) and (31) hold for any level of debt, as creditors have priority to shareholders. Because e CLT,t is influenced by both risk of assets and of debt, we can sum up that:
Inequality (32) 
Recent cash flow theories of capital structure
The above derived framework lets us review selected FCF theories of capital structure.
The subsequent section treats all variables in the nature, the reviewed papers do, i.e. mostly in deterministic nature.
Ruback (2002) Their incorrect r T,t = r U,t stems from their use of "pricing kernel", about which they "need not worry" (ibid: 454). Using not "pricing kernel", but COC, they would find in their equation (12) that by use of the principal repayment both as a part of e T,t and as a DE t , they have to assign r U,t to this bi-directional and bi-risky CF. Principal repayment has its own risk profile (inherent to debt), no matter of expressing it as part of DE t , contrary to their assumption. Interestingly the first part of their equation (12) -before the risk-return flawproperly shows that if D t decreases, then T t < D t t t , and if D t increases, then T t > t t D t . The above problem of (Arzac, Glosten 2005) approach is evident in their equation (13), where the discount rate for debt (and/or equity) valuation is both r D,t and r U,t in the same submultiple -that flaws the both the general and special case derivation of T t (ibid). Arzac and Glosten (2005) . Therefore the same objection can be raised to Fernández (2007) as to Farber et al. (2006) . Qi (2010) provides results similar to (Ruback 2002) , although based on comparison of personal and corporate lending and borrowing rates. Qi (2010) concludes that T t = t t D t if individual could lend/borrow at the same rate as a corporation borrows. Furthermore he assumes D t = D t +1 . However the personal and corporate lending and borrowing rates have no influence on risk profiles of different kinds of capital. Therefore Qi's (2010) conclusions miss the main driver of risk premium -the risk. However I have to agree with him on criticism of Liu (2009), who splits tax shields into earned and unearned. All tax shields are unearned from the ex-ante point of view, and those, which are earned, were already distributed either as CF or as capital value increase.
Oded et al. (2011) base their reasoning of r T,t = r U,t for company, which rebalances its debt share on assets, on the perfect correlation between T t and U t . As the company rebalances debt share, it implicitly creates a fluctuation of debt, thus r T,t = r U,t . Accepting the logic of Oded et al. (2011) , what would be the risk inherent to equity? If debt fluctuates the same way as assets and tax shield value do, then equity has to do so too, because its share on assets is fixed (cp. their equations (3) and (4)). Then their conclusions (8) and (9) contradict their assumptions. We can also object that for non-constant perpetuities with rebalanced debt T t ≠ t t D t r T,t /r U,t . (contrary to their (7)).
Barbi (2012) also implicitly assumes that r T,t = r U,t (but with constant COC), because he starts derivation of tax shield value as a part of value of unlevered equity, to which r U,t is naturally the appropriate rate of return (cp. his equations (13), (14)). The contradiction included in his analysis (p. 254) is that by mixing risk-neutral approach and the classical one he comes to conclusion that tax shield yields risk-free rate of return, but its profile equals risk profile of assets (ibid). There is circularity between tax shield, unlevered capital and total capital (or their cost, respectively), therefore his experimental test show good results despite contradictory assumptions. If one keeps the correct algebra, the (Modigliani, Miller 1963) capital structure framework works in spite of results contradicting assumptions in terms of risk handling. It is worth noting that equation (14) in Barbi (2012) very closely resembles the equation (13) in Arzac, Glosten (2005) and (2) in Fernández (2007) , with one little exception: Barbi (2012) found risk-free rate of return more appropriate than cost of debt for the tax shield.
Qi et al. (2012) come very close to the answer of the crucial question:
what is the risk profile of tax shields, thus also what is r T,t . They present findings similar to (17), but they compare EBT (earnings before tax) and total tax deductibles sum. However, the question of interest tax shield usability lies upon comparison of EBIT and interest accrued! Therefore (interest) tax shield usability does not depend on σ (e E,t ), but on σ (e CLT,t ), resp. σ (e U,t ), and on σ (e D,t ). Qi et al. (2012) provide analysis of the probability of realization of tax deductibles (deductible from EBT), not probability of realization of interest (or debt) tax shield. Although it enables them to address the crowding-out of non-interest tax shields, it precludes use of their findings for interest tax shield. Furthermore their analysis relies upon assumption r T,t = r D,t in case of D t = D t+1 and r T,t = r U,t in case of D t /E t = D t +1 /E t +1 . That requires deterministic debt in otherwise stochastic environment. So a step to understanding tax shields risk and return has been done by Qi et al. (2012) , but a way is still ahead.
The above review of the most recent substantial contributions to the CF theories ofcapital structure shows the need for closer examination of r T,t and influence of CFD. Thorough review of earlier papers (a comprehensive review provides Fernández 2004) would require separate study. There is no way to examine the conclusions about r T,t without examination of its risk. As we can see in (13) any rate of return can be at the place of r T,t , and the whole apparatus will work, but sometimes with weird or extreme results. The reason is mutual dependence between r E,t , r U,t and r T,t .
Value of tax shields
The subsequent section treats all variables as stochastic, if not stated otherwise.
Risk of tax shields can differ from the risk of debt. The e T,t is described by (17) and equals difference between the CCF (e C,t ) and FCFF ( ), as shown in (15). Thus 3 factors determine the tax shield: tax rate, interest accrued, EBIT. Let us consider the case t t is deterministic, e C,t = EBIT t and tax losses cannot be carried forward. With respect to (17), the expected e T,t (i.e.
) is: (34) where N[⋅] is density function of distribution of EBIT t (let us consider normal distribution). The difference between (17) and (34) is that (17) is deterministic, but (34) considers stochastic e T,t . Because higher e C,t decreases r D,t through credit spread decrease, but usually increases D t due to debt policy, we can assume cov(e C,t , D t r D,t ) ≃ 0. Thus we can express σ 2 (r T,t ) utilizing the law of total variance and (22) as:
Abandonment of the assumption that t t is deterministic would require estimation of the product of independent variables (see Goodman (1960) ). The last summand of (35) is variance between conditional expectations and .
If then and
As as well as and variance between and determines cost of tax shield at together with the variance of t t . Then and if variance of t t and variance between conditional expectations and were high enough, even could occur.
If then and , but due to priority of creditors to shareholders. Nevertheless observations, which influence , are limited from below (by zero) and from above (by ), thus we miss the tails, which create the significant part of variance. As due to most probably , thus also at this leverage. That also turns into .
In spite of the possibility of σ (r C,t ) ≤ σ (r T,t ) at low leverages, it holds that r CLT,t < r T,t in most cases (usual leverages) because of (20), as the influence of present value of tax shields on cost of equity (leveraged) has been empirically observed to be negative. Dhaliwal et al. (2006: 714) find, that there is decrease of cost of equity by 46 basis points for each 15% increase of debt/capital ratio at US stocks in 1982 -2004 . Period of 1982 -2004 was period of rapid growth rates on the US stock markets, and Dhaliwal et al. (2006) report long term growth forecasts 1st quartile 7.6% and 3rd quartile 20%! Negative effect of tax rate, or tax rate increase, on cost of equity report also Ahmad et al. (2011 ), or Mnzava (2009 . Another empirical paper wrote Fosberg (2010) , who also finds negative reaction of cost of equity to tax shield value increase (ibid: 26). Because Fosberg (2010) estimates value of tax shields as product of tax rate and amount of debt, he underestimates strongly the size of tax shield, which leads to otherwise unexplainably large regression coefficient of present value of interest tax shields (PVITS as he denotes it).
A question remains: what is the value of tax shield? The relative value of tax shield (relative to debt) is decreased by high leverage in two ways: low EBIT compared to interest, and risk of tax shield CF. The first reason is analyzed by Qi et al. (2012) , who report the tax shield CF being cranked in similar way as equation (17) would suggest (but they base their analysis on tax deductibles). The second reason, the CF risk, is analyzed above. Due to many parameters, which can influence σ (r T,t ), the only way to truly examine it is a simulation.
Simulation of capital structure with risky debt and tax shields
Capital value and COC are simulated based on equations (18), (19), (20), (23) and (34) with a discrete time to assess the effect of cost of financial distress (CFD) on capital structure. The option form of tax shield CF (34) provides similar values of r T,t as (17) for the same leverage.
Parameters and assumptions of simulation are: D t /E t = D t +1 /E t +1 , i.e. steady growth g ∈ {1%; 4%} is deterministic, t t ∈ {10%; 35%} with σ(t t ) = 3% in both cases, r f,t = 5%, r U,t = r f,t + 15% × σ 2 (e C,t ).
, where p t is probability that e C,t < D t r D,t reflects CFD b ∈ {10%; 30%}. Cost of debt r D,t = r f,t +(r CLT,t -r f,t )D t /C t .. I have tested the whole model also with (17) instead of (34) and r CLT,t = r U,t (1 + bD t /C t ) with generally the same results as below. To reflect tax rate variance in tax shield risk, I utilize Goodman's (1960) conclusions. Investors are mean-variance optimizers in the meaning of Sharpe (1964) or Ross (1976) , which means that price of systematic risk is constant. Because:
and correlation between capital X and market portfolio (ρ X,M ), as well as risk of market portfolio σ (r X,M ) are not dependent on leverage, simulation also respects equation (21).
The simulation includes: 1. low-growth-low-risk companies, some of which skillfully use tax optimization, e.g. real estate developers, or airlines (g = 1%, t = 10%, or t t = 35%, b = 10%), simulation results are at Figures 1 and 2 . 2. high-growth-high-risk companies, which also have high CFD, e.g. dotcoms, bio- That allows us to examine some of the anomalies to the traditional capital structure theory: why the most profitable and healthy companies keep so much cash (or use so little net debt, as only debt less excessive cash counts), why the young companies tend to issue shares instead of borrowing, or why all of the theories: CF theories of capital structure, pecking order theory, and static tradeoff theory are confirmed by empirical tests (Harris, Raviv 1999; or Myers 2001) .
Use of debt can increase company value by only small amount at the low-growth-low-risk companies. The r T,t is very close to r D,t in the whole domain of leverage. Due to ability to provide security, the CFD is low and such companies use high leverage to increase the return to equity (r E,t ). These companies seldom go public because of high r E,t . It is worth noting that each point (triangle, cross) on the curves of the value of CLT t , C t or r D,t means increase of debt face value by one unit. Increase of the debt by one unit changes leverage at these companies at low and high leverages similarly, which makes low-growth-low-risk companies, which use tax optimization, flexible even at high leverages.
In case the tax rate becomes high (t t = 35%), behavior of COC changes at low-growthlow-risk companies. Tax shield brings still quite low advantage due to low growth, but r E,t becomes flat until very high leverages. The r T,t is very close to r D,t again. Such companies still like to use debt, but not as much, as observed at real estate developers (and similar) companies (Fig. 1) . Quite flat r E,t curve makes it more attractive to go public than it was at e.g. real estate developers. The crosses and triangles on the curves of CLT or capital value become less dense after capital value maximum. As each cross or triangle means one unit of debt face value, that means fast decrease of capital value in these areas, and makes such companies unlikely to draw additional debt. Then such a company would like to issue equity to get back to optimal debt levels ( Fig. 2) .
The high-growth-high-risk companies with high CFD, like dotcoms or biotechs (Fig. 3 ) cannot gain substantial advantage from debt use, because all COC increase since quite low leverages. There is high T t /C t ratio at high leverages at these companies. If that is lost due to unfulfilled expectations of EBIT, then indebtedness grows very quickly and equity value drops (Fig. 3) . That might be why these companies avoid using debt or use low leverages. High risk and high CFD make the use of debt disadvantageous to these companies.
My model predicts that growth blue chips regulate leverage closely within the optimal territory. The optimal market debt (less cash)/capital ratio is moderate, which can be achieved by low debt and/or high cash. The static tradeoff theory predicts these companies to have high leverages due to high earnings capacity. But our analysis shows that the low difference between r T,t and g makes the low leverage optimal. The distance between marks on the curves increases at higher-than optimal leverages (see Fig. 4 ), but not so strongly as with biotechs and dotcoms (Fig. 3) . Flat r E,t curve is remarkable too. The r E,t could even decrease (Dhaliwal et al. 2006: 714) with increasing leverage due to high g. This case can also explain why some companies accumulate cash while drawing debt. If debtor keeps high cash, then risk is low and r D,t stays low too. Yet the equity financing is still affordable even for blue chip companies even after reaching the downward sloping part of C t curve.
Finally the high-risk-low-growth companies' case ( Fig. 5) shows in the same way as low-growth-low-risk companies did, what drives the shareholders of these companies to high leverage. The high leverage enables to increase return to equity mainly by exploitation of the tax shields. It also shows why they easily become bankrupt. In the simulation it took 3 units of debt face value to get from 40 % to 60 % debt face value/ capital. Just 3 more units of debt are enough to get bankrupt.
The model explains why some companies chose moderate debt levels, thus they fit the static tradeoff theory, as Myers (2001: 88) writes. At the same time it is also able to explain variance of leverages among different industries (see e.g. Harris, Raviv 1991: 334):
1. why companies with valuable assets use high debt levels, 2. why increase of profitability increases leverage (cp. the above results for highrisk-low-growth companies and results for low-risk-low-growth; risk is multiple of EBIT mean so the results can be viewed in a relative way to each other), 3. why lack of growth opportunities increases leverage and high CF decreases it. Theory and evidence on the above relations provides e.g. Harris and Raviv (1991: 343-349) . From the point of view of company life cycle my results imply that young companies would prefer internal financing or equity. They would like to issue debt and regulate its level by equity issues as they grow mature and less risky. Finally, the mature companies or those in shrinking industries like debt, and issue shares only as a defense against bankruptcy.
A look at the above model in a dynamic way shows that distressed companies issue equity to get back to optimal capital structure. The last financial turmoil in 2008 and 2009 provides the evidence. Moreover simulations show that r T,t does not depend on financing policy, but depends on r D,t , r CLT,t , while the share of these costs in r T,t changes with growth and risk.
Discussion
The simulation of capital value and COC can explain many observed capital structures, and implies that equity issue is rather safety brake at companies with non-corner optimal capital structure. CF theory of capital structure in this paper can explain some observations, which resist tradeoff theory or pecking order theory. Nevertheless this paper needs improvement: 1. The model does not incorporate the option nature of all sorts of capital, although theory moves towards option structure of firm, despite unresolved basic CF model of capital structure. Increase of risk (earnings standard deviation) as well as increase of cost of financial distress mostly leads to decrease of optimal debt level in both systems (Bradley et al. 1984 vs. this paper) . The difference is however in mathematical apparatus and its practical usability. Bradley et al. (1984) do not consider growth and do not provide simple system of equations, which would describe cost of capital and capital values. The review of literature on FCF theories of capital structure documents quite well the popularity of Modigliani and Miller (1958) -like models, which this paper also tries to satisfy. By incorporating the risk and growth and by departure from the fixed capital structure and fixed r CLT,t (r U,t ) FCF theory of capital structure, this paper becomes able to analyze the influence of leverage in more realistic way, compared to the most significant FCF theories of capital structure (for overview see Fernández 2004 ).
Conclusions
The dynamic CF model of capital structure described in this paper allows us to examine most of the recent CF theories of capital structure. Most of them have troublesome circularities or implicit assumptions, which either do not fit reality or contradict other assumptions of those models. Therefore I provide an analysis of riskiness of different types of capital as well as adjustment of the dynamic CF model of capital structure to cost of financial distress. The analysis of risk inherent to tax shields done via simulation in this paper shows that tax shield cost, as well as the optimal financing policy, depends on risk and growth opportunities. Cost of tax shield is mostly between the cost of debt and cost of unlevered equity (or cost of "capital less tax shield", because unlevered equity is observable only at company with zero leverage). Combinations of risk (in a form of CF variance), growth, and tax rate provide suitable explanation for puzzling observations: low-leverage blue chips, quite general applicability of pecking order theory, or use of high leverage at low-growth companies.
